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See Latest ArticlesPrimary care delivery, risk pooling and economic efficiency
The European Journal of Health Economics, 06/18/09
Leung MCM et al. - The consequences of consumer-driven health care under different health insurance plans are studied by means of a game theoretic approach. Suitable demand-side cost-sharing can induce consumer behavior that avoids over-treatment when there are information asymmetries between providers and consumers, leading to the efficient recommendations and provision of treatment by providers.
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